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Abstract
In the secure communication problem, we focus on safe termination. In applica-
tions such as electronic transactions, we want each party to be ensured that both
sides agree on the same state: success or failure. This problem is equivalent to the
well known coordinated attack problem. Solutions exist. They however concentrate
on the probability of disagreement, and attack incentives have been overlooked so
far. Furthermore, they focus on a notion of round and are not optimal in terms of
communication complexity.
To solve the safe termination problem, we revisit the Keep-in-Touch protocol that
we introduced in 2003. Considering the communication complexity, the probability
of unsafe termination, and the attack incentive, we prove that the Keep-in-Touch
protocol is optimal.
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1 Synchronization Protocol
For applications requiring secure communication, we often use standard cryp-
tography to achieve security at the packet level in terms of authentication,
integrity, and confidentiality. Assuming cryptography performs a good job,
adversaries can still try to remove, replay, or permute packets. Standard so-
lutions consist in authenticating a sequence number for each packet so that
the packet sequentiality can no longer be corrupted. One remaining problem
though: the adversary can still maliciously remove final packets by disconnect-
ing the channel, depending on what she has seen so far (namely, the volume
and directions of packets). To solve this, both parties must agree that the
communication is over by means of a synchronization protocol.
In contract signing protocols, after participant Alice sent the signed contract
to Bob, Bob signed it and sent it back to Alice, Bob may assume that the
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contract is signed and will be executed but Alice may have never received the
signature and may be assuming that Bob declined the contract. Informally,
contract signing should be followed by a synchronization protocol: each party
decides whether the protocol is assumed to have succeeded and launch a syn-
chronization protocol with this input bit. At the end of the protocol, their
output tells whether it is indeed agreed on a success or not.
Definition 1 A synchronization protocol specifies two probabilistic algorithms
A and B that communicate together. Both algorithms start with an input bit
and terminate with an output bit. We require that
• A and B eventually halt;
• no algorithm yield 1 if its input is 0;
• when the channel is not disconnected, A and B always yield the product of
the two input bits.
The synchronization succeeds if both A and B terminate with the same output.
Adversaries are assumed to know the algorithms A and B, their input bits (but
not their input coins), and can see at every step if a protocol message is emitted
(but not its actual content) by either A or B. The only possible action by the
adversary is to cut the communication link. The protocol quality is measured
by
• C, the communication complexity in terms of number of messages that A
and B exchange;
• Pa (probability of asymmetric termination), the maximum of the probability
that the protocol fails, over all possible adversaries;
• Pc (probability that crime pays off), the maximum of the conditional prob-
ability that the protocol fails, conditioned on the protocol to be interrupted
by a malicious disconnection, over all possible adversaries.
Note that there is a tricky distinction between Pa and Pc which will be shown
in the sequel. Pa gives confidence to A and B that the protocol will succeed
while Pc measures the incentive for misbehavior.
Related work. In 1978, Gray [5] introduced the Generals paradox, later
called coordinated attack problem. In this problem, two or several participants
must agree on a binary decision (attack or not) through a communication
channel that can maliciously remove messages. Even and Jacobi [3] have shown
that it cannot be solved with 100% probability with finite complexity so we
must consider a probability of disagreement. As detailed below, optimal solu-
tions have been proposed (first in 1992) in the multiparty case by Lynch and
Varghese [6,8]. Problems that are related to coordinated attack include con-
sensus [4], non-blocking atomic commitment [2,7], and fair exchange. Those
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usually consider the Byzantine failure model, which allows arbitrary behavior
of a bounded number of participants. Here, we assume that participants are
all correct and that cryptography already protects the communication link ex-
cept disconnection. In 2003, we introduced in [1] the notion of Keep-In-Touch
protocol (KiT) to solve a specific fair exchange problem: two malicious partic-
ipants assisted by one guardian angel each who try to fairly exchange digital
information. It is assumed that the two guardian angels trust each other but
that their communication channel go through the untrusted participants. The
KiT-based solution consists of making the exchange at the guardian angels
level, then making a synchronization to check whether the exchange was fair,
and finally releasing the obtained digital information.
Varghese-Lynch protocol. In the protocol by Varghese and Lynch [6,8],
the participants run a given (public) number of rounds r in any case (namely,
even when they stop receiving messages by others). Rounds are scheduled
periods of time during which the participants must exchange a message in all
directions. The protocol is optimal in terms of number of rounds. (For two
participants, the message complexity is indeed C = 2r and the running time
is r “units” where a unit upper bounds the required time to exchange two
messages. So, some time is wasted if transmission is faster than a unit.) At
the beginning, the originator of the protocol picks a random number N ∈
{1, . . . , r} with uniform distribution and sends it to his counterpart. Each
party manages a counter initialized to 0, whose value is sent in each message.
At the end of a round, the internal counter is synchronized with the received
one (if any). At the beginning of a round, it is incremented by 1. The secret
number N picked by the originator is a threshold used at the end of the
exchanges: each party outputs 1 if and only if its counter is at least equal to
N . So, the only way for the adversary to injure the parties is to guess the
value N , and then to cut any messages, provided that one counter is equal
to N while the other is smaller. Analysis shows that Pa = Pc =
1
r
([6,8] only
consider Pa but we can easily show that Pc is the same in the case of this
protocol).
Our contribution. In this paper, we focus on average communication com-
plexity in terms of number of exchanged messages. We distinguish the mea-
sures Pa and Pc (while previous work concentrated on Pa). Then, we formalize
a variant of the Keep-In-Touch protocol (KiT). We show that it is a syn-
chronization protocol. Finally, we prove optimality in terms of number of ex-
changed messages. It is notably more efficient than the Lynch-Varghese proto-
col with two participants since the running time no longer depends on synchro-
nized rounds and that we achieve Pa = Pc ≤ 1E(C)−1 instead of Pa = Pc = 2C .
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2 Keep-in-Touch Protocol
We propose a variant of the KiT protocol (that we call KiT protocol as well
in the sequel) as depicted on Fig. 1. The principle is quite simple: if the input
of A is 1 then A picks a random number N ≥ 0 and sends it to B (note that
the confidentiality of N is protected). N represents the number of messages
that should be exchanged after B joined the protocol by sending his first mes-
sage. Depending on the probability distribution for N , it can be bounded or
not. Then, if both inputs are 1, A and B just keep in touch by sequentially
exchanging authenticated messages. Contrarily to the first message which in-
cludes N , the N +1 other messages are really empty ones! In case of time-out
while expecting a message, a participant stops and yields 0.
A B
input : a input : b
if a = 0, output 0
pick N
N−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if b = 0, output 0
m0=∅←−−−−−−−−−−−−
m1=∅−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m2=∅←−−−−−−−−−−−−
m3=∅−−−−−−−−−−−−→
...
mN−1=∅←−−−−−−−−−−−−
mN=∅−−−−−−−−−−−−→
wait
output : 1 output : 1
Fig. 1. Keep-in-Touch (KiT) Protocol
Termination side channel protection. In the case where the adversary
has access to the output of A or B through a side channel, the last sender
should wait for a given period larger than the time-out before terminating.
This makes sure that both A and B complete before the adversary gets any
side information. The last receiver might still acknowledge for the last message
to prevent the other party from waiting, but disconnection at this point should
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not change the output. The consequence of such an attack is only a time loss
for the waiting participant.
Time-out removal. Similarly, when a = 0, A can prevent B from waiting
by sending a specific message. The a = 1 and b = 0 case is similar.
Theorem 1 The KiT Protocol is a synchronization protocol. Let p0, p1, . . .
denote the probability distribution of N in the protocol, i.e., pi = Pr[N =
i]. The average message complexity is such that E(C) ≤ 2 + E(N) where
E(N) =
∑
i ipi, the probability of asymmetric termination is Pa = maxi pi and
the probability that the crime pays off is Pc = maxi
(
pi/
∑
j≥i pj
)
.
Proof 1 When no attack occurs and a = b = 1, the complexity in terms
of exchanged messages is exactly equal to C = N + 2. When the channel
is cut or ab = 0, the complexity is smaller, so we can just focus on N . By
definition, the average complexity is 2 + E(N), where E(N) =
∑
i ipi. Note
that the communication and time complexities are linear in terms of N due to
the simplicity of the message contents and the computations to perform.
Obviously, all properties in Definition 1 are satisfied so we have a synchro-
nization protocol. We now measure its quality in terms of Pa and Pc.
Pa computation. Clearly, disconnecting A from B in the first message makes A
and B output 0 and the protocol succeeds. We now assume that the adversary
is willing to drop mi. If N < i then the attack has no influence and the protocol
successfully terminates. If N > i, the participant who is expecting mi cannot
send the next one, so both participants are blocked and the protocol succeeds
since both A and B yield 0 after time-outs expire. Clearly, the protocol fails
only if N = i, thus with probability pi. Therefore we have Pa = maxi pi.
Pc computation. With the same discussion we can show that the above misbe-
havior has a conditional probability of success of Pr[N = i|N ≥ i]. Hence we
have Pc = maxi
pi∑
j≥i pj
. 2
Example 1 For any n, when p0 = · · · = pn−1 = 1n and pi = 0 for i ≥
n we have E(N) = n−1
2
thus E(C) ≤ n+3
2
and a probability of asymmetric
termination of Pa =
1
n
. The worst case complexity is C = n+ 1. However we
have Pc = 1 (with i = n − 1). In other words, the longer the adversary waits
before performing his attack, the greater the probability the attack succeeds,
in particular if his strategy is to disconnect at mn−1 then his attack definitely
succeeds.
Example 2 For any p, when pi = (1 − p)ip for i ≥ 0 we have E(N) =
1
p
− 1 thus E(C) ≤ 1
p
+ 1 and a probability of asymmetric termination of
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Pa = p. In this case we also have Pc = p. With the same Pa and Pc as in
the Lynch-Varghese protocol, our protocol has an average complexity at most
r+ 1 messages instead of 2r. It does not waste time. However, the worst case
complexity in not bounded.
Optimal distributions for the KiT protocol. The distribution choice
plays on the message complexity and the parameters Pa and Pc. Obviously
there is a trade-off. The optimal case is studied in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let p0, p1, . . . denote the probability distribution of N in the KiT
protocol. We have E(N) ≥ 1
2
(
1
Pa
− 1
)
and E(N) ≥ 1
Pc
−1 where Pa and Pc are
the probability of asymmetric termination and the probability that the crime
pays off respectively.
This shows that Example 1 is the optimal case for Pa and that Example 2 is
the optimal case for Pc.
Proof 2 We want to minimize E(N) for a given Pa. Due to Theorem 1, it is
equivalent to finding p0, p1, . . . such that 0 ≤ pi ≤ Pa for all i, ∑ pi = 1, and∑
ipi minimal.
Let n = b 1
Pa
c and α = 1
Pa
− n. We have α ∈ [0, 1[.
Obviously
∑
ipi is minimal when the first pis are maximal, i.e., when p0 =
p1 = · · · = pn−1 = Pa. The sum of all remaining pi is equal to 1− nPa. Thus
we have
E(N) ≥ Pa + 2Pa + · · ·+ (n− 1)Pa + n(1− nPa).
Hence E(N) ≥ n(n−1)
2
Pa + n(1− nPa). If we substitute 1Pa − α to n we obtain
E(N) ≥ 1
2
(
1
Pa
− 1
)
+
αPa
2
(1− α).
Since 0 ≤ α < 1 we have E(N) ≥ 1
2
(
1
Pa
− 1
)
. This proves the first bound.
For the second bound we notice that
E(N) =
+∞∑
i=1
∑
j≥i
pj =
+∞∑
i=0
∑
j≥i
pj − 1.
Since we have
∑
j≥i pj ≥ piPc for all i due to Theorem 1, we obtain that E(N) ≥
1
Pc
− 1. 2
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Bit-messages variant. Instead of picking N once and sending it at the
beginning of the protocol, we can just ask each participant to toss a coin
before sending mi and sending the result of the toss in the message. “Head”
means “let’s keep in touch” and “tail” means “so long”. Obviously, if the coin
is biased such that the ith toss is “tail” with probability Pr[N = i|N ≥ i],
this variant is fully equivalent to the above protocol. Example 2 is equivalent
to the case where the probability to get “tail” is p for all i.
3 Optimality of the KiT Protocol
We prove in this section that our protocol is optimal within our settings. This
also (re)proves that perfect synchronization cannot be ensured with Pa = 0 or
Pc = 0 with a finite message complexity (since KiT protocols do not).
Theorem 3 For any synchronization protocol between two participants A and
B (initiated by A) with parameters Pa and Pc, we let C = N + 2 denote the
number of exchanged messages. We can define a random variable N ′ such that
Pr[N ′ ≤ N ] = 1 and that N ′ defines a KiT protocol A′B′ with parameters P ′a
and P ′c such that Pa ≥ P ′a and Pc ≥ P ′c.
Proof 3 We are given two (probabilistic) algorithms A and B which exchange
N + 2 messages in normal conditions. Without loss of generality, we assume
that A initiates the protocol. We now construct a KiT protocol A′B′ which
uses N ′ + 2 messages. Note that we only need to define how A′ computes N ′
since the remaining part of A′ and B′ are fully specified by the KiT protocol.
We first note that when either input is 0, the KiT protocol is always optimal:
sending less messages may lead to cases which would violate the definition of
the synchronization protocol. We deduce that N must be positive when both
inputs are 1. We concentrate in this case in what follows.
In order to compute N ′, A′ first simulates a normal interaction between A and
B with input 1. We assume that all random coins are set in advance by A′ so
that the simulation is run on deterministic algorithms. Note that the simulator
can freely restart A or B in a previous state. Hence, A′ can define the following
quantities based on a random instance of the simulation. Let x1, x2, . . . , xN+2
be a sequence of bits in which xi is equal to 0 when the ith message is sent from
A to B, and to 1 when it is sent in the other direction. By definition of the
synchronization protocol, both A and B yield 1 after the final message. A′ now
analyzes the final output in case the adversary disconnects the channel at the
ith message (i.e., this message is sent but never received) for i = 1, . . . , N +2.
We define ai (resp. bi) as the final output of A (resp. B) if the channel is
disconnected at the ith message. We let N ′ + 2 be the smallest i such that
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aj = bj = 1 for any j ≥ i. Obviously we always have N ′ ≤ N . In the rest of
the proof we demonstrate that the P ′a and P
′
c parameters for the A
′B′ protocol
are no larger than the Pa and Pc parameters for the AB protocol. In order to do
this we show that any attack strategy S ′ against A′B′ can be transformed into
an attack strategy S against AB with at least the same probability of success.
An attack S ′ against A′B′ is fully defined by the index i of the message from
which the channel is disconnected. We consider the attack S against AB which
cuts the channel when the ith message is sent. The attack S ′ succeeds only for
instances of the AB simulation in which i = N ′ + 2. We show below that S
also succeeds for the same instances. We deduce that no attack against A′B′
is more successful than any attack against AB. Hence Pa ≥ P ′a and Pc ≥ P ′c.
Let us assume that xi = 0. By definition of N
′ we have aN ′+2 = bN ′+2 = 1,
but we do not have aN ′+1 = bN ′+1 = 1. We notice that aN ′+1 = aN ′+2 since
everything is normal for A. Thus we have bN ′+1 = 0. Since B does not receive
the ith message, B eventually yields 0 while A yields 1. A similar argument
holds for xi = 1. 2
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